Many organisms vary their level of investment in defensive characters. Protective traits may be induced upon exposure to predators or parasites. In a similar way, humans vaccinate in response to threatening epidemics. When most group members defend themselves, epidemics die out quickly because parasites cannot spread. A high level of group (herd) immunity is therefore bene¢cial to the group. There is, however, a well-known divergence between the optimum degree of induction for sel¢sh individuals and the level of induction that maximizes group bene¢t.
INTRODUCTION
Cladocerans develop protective helmets when predators threaten (Havel 1987) . Plants induce a variety of structural and biochemical defences in response to herbivory or infection (Karban & Baldwin 1997) . Humans engender immunity by vaccination. These inducible defences have two widely discussed features: protection against attack, and costs that prevent constant expression by all members of a population (Harvell 1990) .
The frequency of defended individuals in a group in£uences the dynamics of attack and disease (Anderson & May 1991) . When most group members defend themselves, epidemics die out quickly because parasites cannot spread. Similarly, predators and herbivores may abandon well-defended, unpro¢table groups. The phrasè herd immunity' summarizes the ways in which the frequency of resistance in£uences the dynamics of attack (Anderson & May 1990) .
The optimum induction strategy for an individual depends on the probability of attack and the costs of defence (van Baalen 1998) . At some frequency of group immunity, individual hosts no longer gain su¤cient bene¢t to outweigh the cost of induction. That optimum, based on a game-theory analysis of costs and bene¢ts to sel¢sh individuals, is often well below the frequency of immunity that provides optimum protection per individual in a cooperative group (Anderson & May 1990) . Such tensions between the optimum for sel¢sh individuals and the optimum for members of a cooperative group are common in social interactions (Frank 1998) .
I develop two simple optimality models for the frequency of induction favoured by natural selection. The ¢rst model shows the in£uence of genetic relatedness among group members on the frequency of induction. As expected, higher relatedness favours more induction and a smaller di¡erence between sel¢sh and cooperative optima.
The second model assumes variation in the vigour of individuals and therefore di¡erences in the relative cost for induction. The model predicts that vigorous individuals induce more easily. Relatively strong and weak individuals diverge in optimal phenotype very quickly as the di¡erence between their levels of vigour increases. Surprisingly, the smaller the cost of induction, the more rapid the di¡erentiation between strong and weak.
RELATEDNESS
Individuals that induce defence pay a cost in reduced ¢tness and gain protection against attack. The probability of attack declines as the average frequency of induction in the group rises. The following model captures these features:
where the ¢tness of an individual, w, depends on its probability, y, of inducing defence in response to a signal, and the average probability, z, of induction over all members of the group. Here y and z are assumed to be measures of additive genotypic value (breeding value) under the standard assumption that the slope of phenotype on breeding value is one. The cost of induction is c and the probability of future attack is a. The term 1 À y describes protection from attack for those who induce defences, and f (z) is a decreasing function of z that summarizes the reduction in attack probability from increasing herd immunity. Frank (1998) explains this type of formulation and the following approach.
The optimum probability of induction, y Ã , is obtained by maximization of w with respect to small variants in y, from the solution of dw dy dw dy r dw dz 0, evaluated at y z y Ã . The partial derivatives arise from standard application of the chain rule for di¡erentiation, and r dzady is the coe¤cient of relatedness from kinselection theory (Taylor & Frank 1996) . Note that this coe¤cient is simply the slope of group genotype on individual genotype or, equivalently, the slope of the average social partner's genotype on the actor's genotype.
The ¢rst term of the derivative is
which is the direct, marginal e¡ect of induction on the individual's own ¢tness. The second term is
which is the marginal e¡ect of induction on neighbours' ¢tness, weighted by the coe¤cient of relatedness, r. Here f H is the partial derivative of f with respect to z. The two partial derivatives of w are the cost and bene¢t in a marginal form of Hamilton's rule for kin selection (Hamilton 1964; Frank 1998) .
These terms provide some clues about marginal costs and bene¢ts. Solution requires an explicit assumption about the form of the herd immunity function, f . For simplicity, let f (z) 1 À z, that is, f H (z) À1, and thus susceptibility declines linearly with the frequency of defended individuals in the group. More realistic functions, derived from explicit dynamic considerations, are possible, but the purpose here is simply to illustrate the processes that shape induction.
The linear assumption for herd immunity yields a quadratic
where x 1 À y Ã . This is easily solved by standard methods, but the solution has many terms and must be plotted to gain some insight (¢gure 1).
VARIABLE RESOURCES
Individuals typically di¡er in the amount of resources available to them and in their overall vigour. Induction of defence may require a smaller proportion of total resources from relatively stronger individuals. I present a model in which individuals di¡er in vigour and there is no relatedness among group members (r 0). For individuals with vigour or resource level k, ¢tness is
where y k is the probability of induction for resource level k. The herd immunity function, F, depends on the values, y k , for all resource levels, k, and on the probability distribution for k. A local optimum is obtained by simultaneous solution of dw k ady k 0 for all k, which yields
The herd immunity function, F, depends on the values of y k ; thus explicit assumptions for F are required for the solution. As before, assume that F declines linearly with the average level of induction in the group, F 1 À y.
(The overbar denotes population average; in this model there is no distinction between group and population averages.) The solution can now be obtained if we also assume that 04x k 41 for all k, implying that x k and y k Figure 1 . The equilibrium probability of induction when neighbouring members of a herd include relatives. Plots show solutions of equation (1) for the parameters: c, cost of resistance, ((a)c 0X05; (b)c 0X2) r, relatedness among group members who are connected by a strong in£uence on each other's ultimate probability of exposure to attack; and a, the probability of attack or infection of a group member. The values of a are shown above each curve. The probability of attack may be thought of as a conditional probability of future attack given a prior history of exposure to enemies.
are equivalent. I make this assumption for the remainder of this section. I also assume that the average resource level is one (k 1). Next, note that when one integrates the left and right sides of equation (2) over the distribution of k, one obtains
Replacing F with 1 À y according to the de¢nition given above, the optimum average probability of induction y Ã can be obtained. The solution is identical to that of the previous section for y Ã , in which there was no variation in resources and r 0. Thus the average level of induction is not in£uenced by variation in resources when 05x k 51 for all k. A few substitutions show that the optimum probability of induction for each resource level is
If costs of induction are relatively small, then small variations in vigour, k, cause a large divergence in the optimum probability of induction between strong (high k) and weak (low k) individuals. As the cost, c, declines, the divergence in behaviour between strong and weak individuals rises.
CONCLUSIONS
The models make two predictions. First, selection favours members of kin groups to invest more in defence than individuals that mix primarily with non-relatives. This could, for example, be tested within a bird population by comparing the immune-system responsiveness of individuals that live in cooperative family groups with the responsiveness of those that were £oating as unattached individuals. There is, of course, the di¤culty of many uncontrollable factors in wild populations; manipulative experiments in natural populations or in captive colonies may be necessary.
The second prediction concerns the rapid change of induction status favoured with changes in vigour. This could be tested most easily by manipulating food supply. Small organisms such as Daphnia should be relatively easy to study in this way, but the same ideas apply to inducible defences of all species.
The discrepancy between individual and group optima is an important public health issue in human vaccination. The models developed here depend on evolutionary optimization of ¢tness, but the concepts could be developed within an economic context of maximizing some objective function (Maynard Smith 1982) . Because the goal in both evolutionary and economic terms is e¤ciently to avoid attack, the outcomes should be similar.
The models here highlight that relatedness reduces the gap between individual and group optima. Relatedness can be interpreted as correlated economic interests and correlated behavioural strategies among group members (Frank 1998) . Thus the role of population structure in the public health problem can be studied with methods that are similar to those developed here.
